

The possibilities and limits of responsible gambling programs in preventing gambling-related harms

10th SNSUS conference on gambling and problem gambling 1 - 3 of June 2015

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Responsible gambling policies

- Beyond-compliance policies - self-regulation (see Wohl et. al., 2013)
- Voluntary for operators (and players)
- monetary limits, time limits, pop-up messages, self-exclusion bans/agreements, ethical guidelines (marketing, product design)

Possibilities of responsible gambling (1)

1. Voluntariness for gamblers and operators makes them politically convenient
 - no hard regulation needed
 - submission with consent
 - fit with the contemporary consumer ethics of choosing
2. The use of gambling data
 - in-detail analysis of gambling behavior
3. Identification of problem gamblers (PG)
 - it would be possible to prevent problem gambling completely

Limitations of responsible gambling (1)

1. Freedom paradox (Kingma 2015)
 - if PG`s problem is impaired decision-making, can one expect PG to choose voluntarily RG tools?
 - limited interventions (safeguarding customer freedom)
2. Limited evidence of effectiveness (e.g. Gainsbury 2015; Ladouceur et. Al. 2012)
 - high quality longitudinal studies needed

Limitations of responsible gambling (2)

3. Objectivity and knowledge paradoxes (Kingma 2015)
 - PG estimates considered too often as hard facts
 - false belief in the rational control of gambling problems
 - realisation that part of the problem is beyond control and identification → all PGs do not choose responsible gambling and cannot be forced to

Different uses of responsible gambling

- The many faces of responsible gambling
 - rhetorical ("window-dressing", "lip-service")
 - political
 - effective (?) prevention/harm reduction
 - unintended consequences
 - competitive edge – good business
 - response to impending regulation

Example 1: Political use of RG




Figure 1. Frequencies of expressions related to social responsibility in the annual reports of the Finnish gambling operators between 2003 and 2013.

Example 2: More political use of RG




Figure 2. Frequencies of expressions related to gambling-related harms in the annual reports of the Finnish gambling operators between 2003 and 2013.

Example 3: RG as rhetoric

- Marketing: 27 control cases against the Finnish operators (2010-2014) despite their ethical guidelines
- Assessment of the addiction risk: 9 cases (2010-2014) where the regulator demanded alterations to the proposed product
 - à The operators refused to disclose the results of their “responsibility tool” to experts assessing the products
 - à Responsibility tool and its results were used in a way that hindered the risk assessment

In conclusion

- Evidence on effective voluntary RG measures almost nonexistent
- Without evidence on effectiveness, RG is a matter of "transferring responsibility for industrialized...harm production to end users" (Livingstone & Woolley, 2007) → **is this responsible?**

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Thank you for your attention!

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